Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow in Hiredis
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 2%. No fixed version is recorded.
Hiredis is a minimalistic C client library for the Redis database. In affected versions Hiredis is vulnurable to integer overflow if provided maliciously crafted or corrupted `RESP` `mult-bulk` protocol data. When parsing `multi-bulk` (array-like) replies, hiredis fails to check if `count * sizeof(redisReply*)` can be represented in `SIZE_MAX`. If it can not, and the `calloc()` call doesn't itself make this check, it would result in a short allocation and subsequent buffer overflow. Users of hiredis who are unable to update may set the [maxelements](https://github.com/redis/hiredis#reader-max-array-elements) context option to a value small enough that no overflow is possible.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redis | hiredis | <1.0.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Redis, strongest first
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