Path Traversal in SharpZipLib
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 1.3.0* and 1.3.3.
SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.3.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `destDir` ends with slash. If the `destDir` is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins with the destination directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 contains a patch for this vulnerability.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| icsharpcode | >=1.3.0 <1.3.0*, >=1.3.3 <1.3.3 | 1.3.0*, 1.3.3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket