The Samba AD DC includes checks when adding service principals names (SPNs) to an account to ensure that SPNs do not alias with those already in the database. Some of these checks are able to be bypassed if an account modification re-adds an SPN that was previously present on that account such as one added when a computer is joined to a domain. An attacker who has the ability to write to an account can exploit this to perform a denial-of-service attack by adding an SPN that matches an existing service. Additionally an attacker who can intercept traffic can impersonate existing services resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity.
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 2%. No fixed version is recorded.
The Samba AD DC includes checks when adding service principals names (SPNs) to an account to ensure that SPNs do not alias with those already in the database. Some of these checks are able to be bypassed if an account modification re-adds an SPN that was previously present on that account, such as one added when a computer is joined to a domain. An attacker who has the ability to write to an account can exploit this to perform a denial-of-service attack by adding an SPN that matches an existing service. Additionally, an attacker who can intercept traffic can impersonate existing services, resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| =Affects Samba v4.0.0 and later, Fixed in samba v4.13.17, v4.14.12, v4.15.4. |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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