arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel d9a9a4d8ebc2fa534c0eb3eef3dae45f5e61b3e3, Kernel 832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f, Kernel baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477 and 5 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR. The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295, which are described in: * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en In both cases the workaround is described as: | If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the | kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected | cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses: | | 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including | unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`. | | 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI. The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all explicit memory accesses". Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by an LDR, as we have: | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | eret | alternative_else_nop_endif | | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses. The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being: | alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] | .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@: | | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | eret The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the erratum: | Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the | issue from occurring. ... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=6e3ae2927b432a3b7c8374f14dbc1bd9ebe4372c <d9a9a4d8ebc2fa534c0eb3eef3dae45f5e61b3e3, >=471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513 <832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f, >=471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513 <baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477, >=6.1.57 <6.1.191, >=6.5.7 <6.6, =32b0a4ffcaea44a00a61e40c0d1bcc50362aee25, =6.6, >=471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513 <58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0 | d9a9a4d8ebc2fa534c0eb3eef3dae45f5e61b3e3, 832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f, baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477, 6.1.191, 6.6, 58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0 |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=6.5.7 <6.6, >=6.6.0 <6.6.15, >=6.7.0 <6.7.3, >=6.1.57 <6.1.191 | 6.6, 6.6.15, 6.7.3, 6.1.191 |
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