cachefiles: defer exposing anon_fd until after copy_to_user() succeeds
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 4b4391e77a6bf24cba2ef1590e113d9b73b11039, Kernel b9f58cdae6a364a3270fd6b6a46e0fd4f7f8ce32, Kernel d2d3eb377a5d081bf2bed177d354a4f59b74da88 and 1 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: defer exposing anon_fd until after copy_to_user() succeeds After installing the anonymous fd, we can now see it in userland and close it. However, at this point we may not have gotten the reference count of the cache, but we will put it during colse fd, so this may cause a cache UAF. So grab the cache reference count before fd_install(). In addition, by kernel convention, fd is taken over by the user land after fd_install(), and the kernel should not call close_fd() after that, i.e., it should call fd_install() after everything is ready, thus fd_install() is called after copy_to_user() succeeds.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =5.19, >=c8383054506c77b814489c09877b5db83fd4abf2 <4b4391e77a6bf24cba2ef1590e113d9b73b11039, >=c8383054506c77b814489c09877b5db83fd4abf2 <b9f58cdae6a364a3270fd6b6a46e0fd4f7f8ce32, >=c8383054506c77b814489c09877b5db83fd4abf2 <d2d3eb377a5d081bf2bed177d354a4f59b74da88, >=c8383054506c77b814489c09877b5db83fd4abf2 <eac51d9daacd61dcc93333ff6a890cf3efc8c1c0 | 4b4391e77a6bf24cba2ef1590e113d9b73b11039, b9f58cdae6a364a3270fd6b6a46e0fd4f7f8ce32, d2d3eb377a5d081bf2bed177d354a4f59b74da88, eac51d9daacd61dcc93333ff6a890cf3efc8c1c0 |
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