tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Exploited in the wild, in CISA KEV since 18 Sep 2026 (due 21 Sep 2026). Fixed in Kernel 2902c3ebcca52ca845c03182000e8d71d3a5196f, Kernel 29c0ce3c8cdb6dc5d61139c937f34cb888a6f42e, Kernel 3439c15ae91a517cf3c650ea15a8987699416ad9 and 2 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.0, >=84c61fe1a75b4255df1e1e7c054c9e6d048da417 <2902c3ebcca52ca845c03182000e8d71d3a5196f, >=84c61fe1a75b4255df1e1e7c054c9e6d048da417 <29c0ce3c8cdb6dc5d61139c937f34cb888a6f42e, >=84c61fe1a75b4255df1e1e7c054c9e6d048da417 <3439c15ae91a517cf3c650ea15a8987699416ad9, >=84c61fe1a75b4255df1e1e7c054c9e6d048da417 <62708b9452f8eb77513115b17c4f8d1a22ebf843, >=84c61fe1a75b4255df1e1e7c054c9e6d048da417 <c09dd3773b5950e9cfb6c9b9a5f6e36d06c62677 | 2902c3ebcca52ca845c03182000e8d71d3a5196f, 29c0ce3c8cdb6dc5d61139c937f34cb888a6f42e, 3439c15ae91a517cf3c650ea15a8987699416ad9, 62708b9452f8eb77513115b17c4f8d1a22ebf843, c09dd3773b5950e9cfb6c9b9a5f6e36d06c62677 |
Exploit evidence
2 public sources
Timeline
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