scs: fix a wrong parameter in __scs_magic
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 062774439d442882b44f5eab8c256ad3423ef284, Kernel 08bd4c46d5e63b78e77f2605283874bbe868ab19, Kernel 1727e8bd69103a68963a5613a0ddb6d8d37df5d3 and 4 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scs: fix a wrong parameter in __scs_magic __scs_magic() needs a 'void *' variable, but a 'struct task_struct *' is given. 'task_scs(tsk)' is the starting address of the task's shadow call stack, and '__scs_magic(task_scs(tsk))' is the end address of the task's shadow call stack. Here should be '__scs_magic(task_scs(tsk))'. The user-visible effect of this bug is that when CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE is enabled, the shadow call stack usage checking function (scs_check_usage) would scan an incorrect memory range. This could lead 1. **Inaccurate stack usage reporting**: The function would calculate wrong usage statistics for the shadow call stack, potentially showing incorrect value in kmsg. 2. **Potential kernel crash**: If the value of __scs_magic(tsk)is greater than that of __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk)), the for loop may access unmapped memory, potentially causing a kernel panic. However, this scenario is unlikely because task_struct is allocated via the slab allocator (which typically returns lower addresses), while the shadow call stack returned by task_scs(tsk) is allocated via vmalloc(which typically returns higher addresses). However, since this is purely a debugging feature (CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE), normal production systems should be not unaffected. The bug only impacts developers and testers who are actively debugging stack usage with this configuration enabled.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =5.8, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <062774439d442882b44f5eab8c256ad3423ef284, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <08bd4c46d5e63b78e77f2605283874bbe868ab19, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <1727e8bd69103a68963a5613a0ddb6d8d37df5d3, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <57ba40b001be27786d0570dd292289df748b306b, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <9ef28943471a16e4f9646bc3e8e2de148e7d8d7b, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <a19fb3611e4c06624fc0f83ef19f4fb8d57d4751, >=5bbaf9d1fcb9be696ee9a61636ab6803556c70f2 <cfdf6250b63b953b1d8e60814c8ca96c6f9d1c8c | 062774439d442882b44f5eab8c256ad3423ef284, 08bd4c46d5e63b78e77f2605283874bbe868ab19, 1727e8bd69103a68963a5613a0ddb6d8d37df5d3, 57ba40b001be27786d0570dd292289df748b306b, 9ef28943471a16e4f9646bc3e8e2de148e7d8d7b, a19fb3611e4c06624fc0f83ef19f4fb8d57d4751, cfdf6250b63b953b1d8e60814c8ca96c6f9d1c8c |
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