Apache ZooKeeper: SASL authorization bypass on the client port through a client-supplied authorization ID
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Improper Authorization vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper. When SASL authentication is enabled on the client port, the server's SASL callback handler grants every authorization identity (authzid) that a client requests, without checking it against the principal the client authenticated as. The server then tries to replace the requested identity with a canonical form of the authenticated principal, derived from the zookeeper.security.auth_to_local rules. If no rule applies to the principal, canonicalization fails and the error is only logged. The client-requested authzid then becomes the session's SASL identity for all ACL checks. An authenticated client whose principal is not covered by the auth_to_local rules can therefore claim any SASL identity. With the default rules, this includes any Kerberos principal from a realm other than the server's default realm, such as a principal from a cross-realm trusted realm. The client then gets the permissions granted to that identity in sasl ACLs. If the requested identity matches a configured zookeeper.superUser, it gets superuser access to the whole data tree. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.8 or 3.9.7, which fixes the issue.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | >=3.8.0 <=3.8.7, >=3.9.0 <=3.9.6 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket