Ash.count, Ash.exists and Ash.aggregate skip related resources' read policies in filters and sorts
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 3.34.6 and 80936187b27ee94f15cd875affd3141b5cb23185.
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to infer data in related records they cannot read via Ash.count/2, Ash.exists/2 and Ash.aggregate/3. Ash.Actions.Aggregate.run/4 (lib/ash/actions/aggregate.ex) applied only the root resource's read policy before running the aggregate query. The read path also applies each related resource's read policy to filter and sort references that cross a relationship, directly (for example comments.body) or through an aggregate over one, but the aggregate path skipped that step. A caller whose filter or sort reaches these functions, for example through Ash.Query.filter_input/2, an ash_lua script, or an AshAi tool offering count or exists results, can test conditions against related rows hidden from them and recover their existence and attribute values one query at a time. Ash.read/2 and its page counts are not affected. This issue affects ash: from 2.6.0 before 3.34.6.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=2.6.0 <3.34.6, >=30eaf1c6e8524527b703e3c4bfeff7967ee0b37c <80936187b27ee94f15cd875affd3141b5cb23185 | 3.34.6, 80936187b27ee94f15cd875affd3141b5cb23185 |
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