jackson-dataformat-protobuf: signed integer overflow in string-length paths allows unbounded array allocation and OutOfMemoryError
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 2.21.8, 2.22.4, 2.18.12 and 2 more.
ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) <= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit. The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured. A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| FasterXML | >=2.19.0 <2.21.8, >=2.22.0 <2.22.4, >=2.6.0 <2.18.12, >=3.0.0 <3.1.8, >=3.2.0 <3.2.4 | 2.21.8, 2.22.4, 2.18.12, 3.1.8, 3.2.4 |
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