aMQTT: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and Improper Input Validation
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in amqtt 0.11.4.
aMQTT is an open source MQTT broker and client. From 0.11.0 until 0.11.4, add_subscription() in amqtt/broker.py accepts malformed single-level + wildcard placement because it checks substrings instead of validating each slash-delimited level. The _matches() function converts each + into a greedy regular-expression fragment and evaluates it with re.fullmatch(), allowing a filter containing many adjacent + characters to trigger catastrophic backtracking when compared with a topic that partially matches but ultimately fails. Because matching runs synchronously in _run_broadcast(), one subscription followed by a publish can block the broker event loop, stopping message delivery and new connection processing until restart. Anonymous clients can trigger the issue with the default configuration. Any authenticated client permitted to create arbitrary subscriptions and publish messages may still exploit it when authentication is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.4.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yakifo | >=0.11.0 <0.11.4 | ||
| pypi: amqtt | >=0.11.0 <0.11.4, >=0.11.0 <=0.11.3 | 0.11.4 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in amqtt (PyPI), strongest first
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