Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in poweradmin/poweradmin 4.2.6, poweradmin/poweradmin 4.3.5 and poweradmin/poweradmin 4.4.1.
Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. From 4.0.0 until 4.2.6, 4.3.5, and 4.4.1, lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php verifies email second-factor codes through MfaService::verifyCode() without limiting failed attempts, and lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php logs failures without throttling them. An attacker who knows the user's password can repeatedly guess the six-digit code during its ten-minute validity period when email MFA is enabled, potentially bypassing the second factor; the advisory notes MFA is disabled by default and that the practical request rate was not measured. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.6, 4.3.5, and 4.4.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| poweradmin | >=4.0.0 <4.2.6, >=4.3.0 <4.3.5, >=4.4.0 <4.4.1 | ||
| packagist: poweradmin/poweradmin | >=4.0.0 <4.2.6, >=4.3.0 <4.3.5, >=4.4.0 <4.4.1 | 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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