Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 4.9.0 and 915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4.
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root. The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname. This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| benoitc | >=1.24.0 <4.9.0, >=d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c <915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4 | 4.9.0, 915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4 |
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