SumatraPDF: TLS hostname validation disabled in `HttpGet()`
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
SumatraPDF is a multi-format reader for Windows. In version 3.6.1 and earlier, HttpGet() in src/base/Http_win.cpp unconditionally passes INTERNET_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID to WinINet, disabling hostname matching for HTTPS update metadata and crash-symbol requests while retaining certificate-chain validation. A network-positioned attacker with a Windows-trusted certificate for an attacker-controlled domain can impersonate the project's update host, inject promo text and a clickable URL before update metadata validation, and provide an attacker-controlled archive to ExtractSymbols(). Installer replacement is not directly possible because HttpGetToFile() validates TLS and MaybeStartUpdateDownload() restricts the download host. No fixed version is available as of this review.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| sumatrapdfreader | <=3.6.1 |
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