Fiber: CORS wildcard origins matched without a dot boundary, allowing credentialed cross-origin reads
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 2.52.3.
Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. From 2.52.1 until 2.52.3, the CORS middleware's validateDomain wildcard matcher in middleware/cors/utils.go strips the scheme and checks only a host suffix without requiring a dot boundary. An application configured with a wildcard-subdomain AllowOrigins value and AllowCredentials enabled can reflect an unrelated attacker-controlled origin whose host merely ends with the configured base domain. A user who visits that origin can expose authenticated cross-origin responses to the attacker's page; empty-label origins and later comma-space parsing hardening are outside this advisory. This issue is fixed in version 2.52.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| gofiber | >=2.52.1 <2.52.3 | ||
| go: github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 | >=2.52.1 <2.52.3, >=2.52.1 <=2.52.2 | 2.52.3 |
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