Session takeover via Auth Proxy cache key collision
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| grafana | >=11.0.0 <=11.6.17, >=12.0.0 <=12.2.11, >=12.3.0 <=12.3.11, >=12.4.0 <=12.4.9, >=13.0.0 <=13.0.7, >=13.1.0 <=13.1.4, >=13.2.0 <=13.2.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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