Safe Mode Bypass in keras-team/keras
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 3.13.2.
A vulnerability in the `TFSMLayer` class of the `keras` package, version 3.13.0, allows attacker-controlled TensorFlow SavedModels to be loaded during deserialization of `.keras` models, even when `safe_mode=True`. This bypasses the security guarantees of `safe_mode` and enables arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution during model inference under the victim's privileges. The issue arises due to the unconditional loading of external SavedModels, serialization of attacker-controlled file paths, and the lack of validation in the `from_config()` method.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| keras-team | <3.13.2 | 3.13.2 |
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