OpenBMC IPMI Authentication Bypass via Default userKey and Stale Challenge Value
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
OpenBMC's IPMI implementation, phosphor-net-ipmid, contains a logic flaw in which an unauthenticated client can force the RAKP Message 1 handler to return before it overwrites the authentication object's constructor defaults. The IPMI service then accepts a RAKP Message 3 whose HMAC is computed with the constant 20-byte 'userKey' initialized from the string '0penBmc' and an often-predictable 'bmcRandomNum'. Several downstream vendors implement phosphor-net-ipmid as their IPMI stack, such as NVIDIA and H3C.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenBMC | <=ba6efc502e6b1fabb8ed1ca677ae5eedd64b6361 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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