CVE-2026-18040

published 3 Oct 2026 · updated 5 Oct 2026

HQC leaks private key information through secret-indexed GF(2^8) tables and a secret-dependent fixed-weight sampler

5.9MediumCVSS 5.9EPSS 0%

No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 1.86.

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged.

Affected

Vendors, products and packages with version ranges

VendorProductVersionsFixed
Legion of the Bouncy Castle>=1.73 <1.861.86

Timeline

Every event on this vulnerability

Embed

A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket

CVE-2026-18040 severity on Zeptric[![CVE-2026-18040](https://zeptric.io/badge/cve/CVE-2026-18040.svg)](https://zeptric.io/cve/CVE-2026-18040)