Kong Mesh multi-zone: the global control plane attributes KDS-synced resources by an unvalidated in-band zone identifier
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 2.7.29, 2.11.18, 2.12.14 and 3 more.
On a Kong Mesh global control plane, resources received over the zone-to-global KDS sync are attributed using the in-band, sender-controlled ControlPlane.Identifier rather than the authenticated zone identity derived from the connection. Authenticated zones can have the global control plane store and re-distribute those resources as belonging to another zone. The result is a cross-zone isolation bypass: the holder of a single enrolled zone's credential can inject, attribute, and overwrite resources in another zone's namespace mesh-wide. The root cause lives in Kuma's open-source KDS sync code, which Kong Mesh's control plane is built on.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kong | <2.7.29, >=2.10.0 <2.11.18, >=2.12.0 <2.12.14, >=2.13.0 <2.13.10, >=2.14.0 <2.14.2, >=2.8.0 <2.9.19 | 2.7.29, 2.11.18, 2.12.14, 2.13.10, 2.14.2, 2.9.19 |
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