published 7 Oct 2026 · updated 7 Oct 2026
A predictable seed in the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in the IFTTT pairing token generation of the ASUS RT-BE57 router allows an…
7.7HighCVSS 7.7EPSS 0%
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
A predictable seed in the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in the IFTTT pairing token generation of the ASUS RT-BE57 router allows an unauthenticated nearby user to derive the pairing token and read or modify router settings via observed values from an administrator-initiated IFTTT pairing session.Refer to the ' Security Update for ASUS Router Firmware ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASUS | Router | =3.0.0.6_102 series |
Timeline
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