Privilege Escalation via Dropped Field-Level @authentication
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 5.12.15 and 7.6.0.
@neo4j/graphql from 5.2.0 until the patched versions fails to enforce field-level @authentication rules on root custom-resolver fields when a type-level @authentication rule is also present on the same operation type. When both a type-level @authentication (on Query/Mutation) and a field-level @authentication (on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement — such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: "admin" }) — is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g. roles: ["user"]) is sufficient.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| neo4j | >=5.2.0 <5.12.15, >=6.0.0 <=6.6.4, >=7.0.0 <7.6.0 | 5.12.15, 7.6.0 |
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