Inefficient candidate hostname parsing in crypto/x509
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 1.25.11, 1.26.4 and stdlib 1.26.4.
(*x509.Certificate).VerifyHostname previously called matchHostnames in a loop over all DNS Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entries. This caused strings.Split(host, ".") to execute repeatedly on the same input hostname. With a large DNS SAN list, verification costs scaled quadratically based on the number of SAN entries multiplied by the hostname's label count. Because x509.Verify validates hostnames before building the certificate chain, this overhead occurred even for untrusted certificates.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | <1.25.11, >=1.26.0-0 <1.26.4 | 1.25.11, 1.26.4 | |
| go: stdlib | >=1.26.0-0 <1.26.4 | 1.26.4 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in stdlib (Go), strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket