Langflow: Authenticated Users Can Read, Modify, and Delete Any Flow via Missing Ownership Check
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Langflow 0.5.1 and Langflow 1.5.0.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.5.1, the `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it. This allowed any authenticated user to read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys; modify the logic of another user's AI agents, and/or delete flows belonging to other users. The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with `user_id = NULL`) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter. The fix in version 1.5.1 removes the `AUTO_LOGIN` conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Langflow | Langflow | <0.5.1, <1.5.0, =1.5.0 | 0.5.1, 1.5.0 |
| langflow-ai | <0.5.1, <1.5.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Langflow, strongest first
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