PKCS#12 Files with PBMAC1 Are Accepted with Short HMAC Keys
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.4.6, OpenSSL 3.5.7, OpenSSL 3.6.3 and 1 more.
Issue Summary: The PKCS#12 file processing fails to perform sufficient input validation for files that use Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1) integrity mechanism allowing a certificate and private key forgery. Impact Summary: An attacker impersonating a user can cause a service reading PKCS#12 files to accept forged certificates and private keys with a 1 in 256 probability. If a service accepting PKCS#12 files is using passwords for authenticating the received files, the attacker can create unencrypted PKCS#12 files that use PBMAC1 authentication that specifies an HMAC key of only one byte, allowing them to craft a file that will be accepted with a 1 in 256 probability. That would then cause the service to accept a certificate and private key controlled by the attacker. The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | >=3.4.0 <3.4.6, >=3.5.0 <3.5.7, >=3.6.0 <3.6.3, >=4.0.0 <4.0.1 | 3.4.6, 3.5.7, 3.6.3, 4.0.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
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