Invoking bypass of FIDO/U2F security keys physical interaction in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.52.0 and golang.org/x/crypto 0.52.0.
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| golang.org/x/crypto | <0.52.0 | 0.52.0 | |
| go: golang.org/x/crypto | <0.52.0 | 0.52.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in golang.org/x/crypto (Go), strongest first
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