Local Blobstore may allow arbitrary reads/deletes
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 282.1.12.
When the director sends a long-running request (e.g. compile_package), the agent's reply JSON is consumed by AgentClient. inject_compile_log (line 332-339) reads response['value']['result']['compile_log_id'] and format_exception (line 318-325) reads exception['blobstore_id']; both pass the agent-supplied string unmodified to download_and_delete_blob(blob_id) (line 344-349), which calls @resource_manager.get_resource(blob_id) and, in an ensure block, @resource_manager.delete_resource(blob_id). Api::ResourceManager forwards the id straight to blobstore.get(id) / blobstore.delete(id). When the director is configured with the local blobstore provider, Blobstore::LocalClient#object_file_path(oid) is File.join(@blobstore_path, oid) (local_client.rb:54-56) with no normalisation, so oid = "../../jobs/director/config/director.yml" resolves outside the blobstore root. Affected versions: BOSH Director: All versions prior to v282.1.12
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud Foundry Foundation | <282.1.12 | 282.1.12 |
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