CVE-2026-41583

GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj · published 18 Apr 2026 · updated 17 Nov 2026

ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling

9.3CriticalCVSS 9.3EPSS 0%

No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in zebra-script 5.0.2 and zebrad 4.3.1.

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.

Affected

Vendors, products and packages with version ranges

VendorProductVersionsFixed
ZcashFoundationzebra-script <5.0.2, zebrad <4.3.1
cargo: zebra-script<5.0.25.0.2
cargo: zebrad<4.3.14.3.1

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