pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.
pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains ("proxy", "username") and ("proxy", "password") — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does not include ("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), or ("proxy", "type"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker. This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| pyload | <0.5.0b3.dev100 | ||
| pyload-ng_project | pyload-ng | <0.5.0b3.dev100 | 0.5.0b3.dev100 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
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