Gotenberg: DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 8.32.0.
Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| gotenberg | <8.32.0 | ||
| thecodingmachine | gotenberg | <8.32.0 | 8.32.0 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
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