OCSP responder certificate validity period not checked in public_key
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Erlang/OTP 27.3.4.12, Erlang/OTP 28.5.0.1, Erlang/OTP 29.0.1 and 1 more.
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows forged OCSP responses signed with an expired responder certificate to be accepted as valid. OCSP response verification in pubkey_ocsp:verify_response/5 and pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl does not check the validity period (notBefore/notAfter) of the OCSP responder certificate. An attacker who has obtained the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate can forge OCSP responses that Erlang/OTP accepts as valid. This affects TLS clients using OCSP stapling via the ssl application: a malicious or compromised server can present a revoked TLS certificate together with a forged OCSP response signed by an expired responder key, and the client will accept the revoked certificate as valid. It also affects applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly, where the impact depends on the use case — server-side client certificate validation using this API may allow authentication bypass with a revoked client certificate. This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.12, OTP 28.5.0.1, and OTP 29.0.1, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang | Erlang/OTP | >=27.0 <27.3.4.12, >=28.0 <28.5.0.1, >=29.0 <29.0.1 | 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, 29.0.1 |
| Erlang | OTP | =1.16, =27.0, =2b1a742c651b90f8a7a1fb2ddde73f29915ea376 | * |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Erlang/OTP, strongest first
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