Quadratic fragment-name uniqueness check causes denial of service in absinthe
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 223600c520493dcaf95080af552c413099f92c9d and 1.10.2.
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via quadratic fragment-name uniqueness validation. Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames.run/2 iterates over all fragments and for each one calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, &(&1.name == name)) — a full linear scan of the fragment list. The result is O(N²) comparisons per document, where N is the number of fragment definitions supplied by the caller. Because input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query body, N is fully attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60,000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this single validation phase. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required. This issue affects absinthe: from 1.2.0 before 1.10.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| absinthe-graphql | >=0b46e3bcc06c0d3797bacd64761b908a84646c1d <223600c520493dcaf95080af552c413099f92c9d, >=1.2.0 <1.10.2 | 223600c520493dcaf95080af552c413099f92c9d, 1.10.2 | |
| absinthe-graphql | absinthe | >1.2.0 <1.10.2 | 1.10.2 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
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