Apache Airflow: Arbitrary import in custom deadline-reference deserialization
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Airflow 3.2.2, 3.0.0 and 3.2.2.
Apache Airflow's scheduler-side deadline-reference decoder (`SerializedCustomReference.deserialize_reference`) imported and dispatched arbitrary class paths drawn from DAG-author-controlled serialized state without an allowlist or plugin-registry gate. A DAG author whose code reaches the scheduler — the default on single-host deployments where the DAG bundle is importable from the scheduler process — could embed a custom `DeadlineReference` whose serialized form named an attacker-controlled module path, causing the scheduler to `import_string(...)` and instantiate that class with a live SQLAlchemy session attached. Affects deployments where DAG-author code is less trusted than the scheduler process. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Airflow | <3.2.2 | 3.2.2 |
| Apache Software Foundation | <3.0.0, >=3.0.0 <3.2.2 | 3.0.0, 3.2.2 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Airflow, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket