Open WebUI: shared-chat branch ignores access_type, allowing unauthorized file deletion
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.9.0.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, any authenticated user can permanently delete files owned by other users via DELETE /api/v1/files/{id} when the target file is referenced in any shared chat. The has_access_to_file() authorization gate unconditionally grants access through its shared-chat branch. It checks neither the requesting user's identity nor the type of operation being performed. File UUIDs (which would otherwise be impractical to guess) are disclosed to any user with read access to a knowledge base via GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-webui | <0.9.0 | ||
| openwebui | open_webui | <0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket