OpenAM Unsafe Java Deserialization via SNS
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 16.1.1.
Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.1.1, the anonymous Push Notification SNS callback handled by SnsMessageResource falls back to a CTS predicate blob after a messageId expires from the in-memory dispatcher, treats top-level blob keys as Java class names for Class.forName, and deserializes attacker-controlled JSON through Jackson. A low-privileged user who starts Push Registration and obtains the messageId, shared secret, and challenge can wait for expiry, replace the persistent blob through anonymous callbacks, and trigger class loading and construction in the OpenAM JVM. The primitive can cause classpath-dependent process execution, file writes, or denial of service, although command execution was not confirmed on the tested stock classpath. This issue is fixed in version 16.1.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenIdentityPlatform | openam | <16.1.1 | 16.1.1 |
| OpenIdentityPlatform | <16.1.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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