ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec, Kernel 9e8f6c9d4ecddda2f28baa1678340286cff3969c, Kernel b870f652877bfbe321bd0f4096fc37a93296f7b6 and 5 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =2.6.12, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <9e8f6c9d4ecddda2f28baa1678340286cff3969c, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <b870f652877bfbe321bd0f4096fc37a93296f7b6, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c1c2417c60dbdca5ebb00462f21ee71c2d7f7083, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <ca1c857e2bb74a9fc0606128334f85316d57067b, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <ce57fa439bd1b5d664f334a0c3e3f0e42abb0153, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <fd19eb1c75047a4ed4e855f56cafd704dc3914e0, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <fe31722b0194ff76bf8b461e8bf97a2081147787 | 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec, 9e8f6c9d4ecddda2f28baa1678340286cff3969c, b870f652877bfbe321bd0f4096fc37a93296f7b6, c1c2417c60dbdca5ebb00462f21ee71c2d7f7083, ca1c857e2bb74a9fc0606128334f85316d57067b, ce57fa439bd1b5d664f334a0c3e3f0e42abb0153, fd19eb1c75047a4ed4e855f56cafd704dc3914e0, fe31722b0194ff76bf8b461e8bf97a2081147787 |
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