luci-app-https-dns-proxy Authenticated Command Injection via setInitAction
2 public exploits exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 7%. No fixed version is recorded.
luci-app-https-dns-proxy through 2025.12.29-5 — an optional LuCI web UI add-on for the https-dns-proxy package, distributed through the OpenWrt community packages feed and not installed by default — contains a command injection vulnerability in the setInitAction function. An authenticated user holding the luci.https-dns-proxy ACL permission can inject shell metacharacters through the 'name' parameter of a ubus RPC call to luci.https-dns-proxy setInitAction, resulting in arbitrary command execution as root on the underlying device. Core OpenWrt is not affected; only installations that have opted in to the luci-app-https-dns-proxy package are vulnerable.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| mossdef-org | <=2025.12.29-5 |
Exploit evidence
2 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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