CRLF injection in cookie domain/path options in hackney
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 4.0.1 and 8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540.
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response. This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| benoitc | >=0.9.0 <4.0.1, >=602d5c7f2ea4acbc83ed75230655d935a0750ebc <8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540 | 4.0.1, 8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540 | |
| benoitc | hackney | >=0.9.0 <4.0.1 | 4.0.1 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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