CR/LF injection in query parameter in hackney
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 4.0.1 and ca73dd0aba0ed557449c18288bf07241671a43c9.
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting. hackney does not percent-encode carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the URL query component before constructing the HTTP/1.1 request target. Characters outside the grammar defined in RFC 3986 Section 3.4 must be percent-encoded, but hackney_url:make_url/3 passes the query binary directly without validation or escaping. An attacker who can control all or part of a URL passed to hackney can inject raw CRLF sequences into the query string, which are then sent as HTTP line breaks in the request target. This enables injection of arbitrary HTTP headers or splitting of the HTTP request. This issue affects hackney: from 0.1.0 before 4.0.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| benoitc | >=0.1.0 <4.0.1, >=8bb1a359a81ae58567c84f8d24564e9742e6f2bd <ca73dd0aba0ed557449c18288bf07241671a43c9 | 4.0.1, ca73dd0aba0ed557449c18288bf07241671a43c9 | |
| benoitc | hackney | <4.0.1 | 4.0.1 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
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