Russh: SSH message fields were decoded through allocation-first parsers before field-specific bounds
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in russh 0.61.0.
Russh is a Rust SSH client & server library. From version 0.34.0 to before version 0.61.0, several russh client and server message handlers decoded attacker-controlled SSH strings, name-lists, and byte fields into owned allocations before applying field-specific bounds. A remote SSH peer could send oversized, high-fanout, or malformed length-prefixed fields and make the library allocate, attempt to allocate, or split data before rejecting input that should have been rejected earlier. This issue has been patched in version 0.61.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eugeny | >=0.34.0 <0.61.0 | ||
| cargo: russh | >=0.34.0 <0.61.0 | 0.61.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in russh (Cargo), strongest first
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