path-to-regexp vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service via multiple route parameters
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 0.1.13.
Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambiguity for two parameters. With three or more, the generated lookahead does not block single separator characters, so capture groups overlap and cause catastrophic backtracking. Patches: Upgrade to path-to-regexp@0.1.13 Custom regex patterns in route definitions (e.g., /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+)) are not affected because they override the default capture group. Workarounds: All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b-:c to /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+). If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| path-to-regexp | <0.1.13 | 0.1.13 |
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