Cosmos: Authentication bypass via forward-auth header smuggling on Constellation tunnel in Cosmos-Server
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Cosmos provides users the ability self-host a home server by acting as a secure gateway to your application, as well as a server manager. Prior to 0.22.19, tokenMiddleware in src/proxy/routerGen.go can return through the Constellation tunnel bypass before removing x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers and before invoking AdminOnlyWithRedirect. An attacker with a valid x-cstln-auth API key for an enrolled device who reaches Cosmos through the Constellation Nebula tunnel can supply a chosen x-cosmos-user value to a route with AuthEnabled enabled when the upstream application trusts that forward-auth header. The request can bypass Cosmos JWT, password, MFA, and AdminOnly checks, allowing user impersonation and admin-tier reads or writes exposed by the proxied application. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.19.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| azukaar | <0.22.19 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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