Gogs: Password-reset tokens use account-activation lifetime, ignoring RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, password-reset tokens are generated using conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives (the account-activation lifetime), not conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives. The token lifetime is baked into the token itself at generation time and is re-extracted from the token at verification time, making RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES irrelevant to actual enforcement. When an administrator configures a shorter reset window (e.g., 10 minutes) for compliance or security reasons, reset tokens remain exploitable for the full activation lifetime instead, while the reset email falsely advertises the shorter expiry. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gogs | Gogs | <0.14.3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Gogs, strongest first
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