Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, (*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component — UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or <repo>.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gogs | Gogs | <0.14.3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Gogs, strongest first
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