Tautulli: Path traversal / arbitrary file write via unsanitized upload filename in import_config and import_database
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. Prior to 2.17.2, the import_config handler and the database_file branch of import_database in plexpy/webserve.py join the attacker-controlled config_file.filename or database_file.filename directly to CACHE_DIR without basename reduction or a containment check. An administrator or caller with the instance API key can submit a multipart filename containing parent-directory segments, causing the upload to be created or overwritten outside CACHE_DIR before file-content validation runs. The write is limited to paths permitted to the Tautulli process, but it can enable configuration tampering, service disruption, or code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.17.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tautulli | <2.17.2 |
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