Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment's internal network
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in alextselegidis/easyappointments 1.6.1.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request's `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| alextselegidis | <1.6.0 | ||
| packagist: alextselegidis/easyappointments | <=1.5.2 | 1.6.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in alextselegidis/easyappointments (Packagist), strongest first
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