MCP Context Forge: Hardcoded default JWT_SECRET_KEY shipped in source and .env.example enables pre-authentication platform admin token forgery
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
MCP Context Forge is an MCP gateway and administrative platform. Prior to 1.0.2, mcpgateway/config.py and .env.example ship a known JWT_SECRET_KEY, while verify_jwt_token() accepts HS256 tokens signed with that key and get_current_user() creates a platform administrator when the token subject matches PLATFORM_ADMIN_EMAIL and REQUIRE_USER_IN_DB is false. A remote unauthenticated attacker can therefore mint accepted administrator tokens without a database account. While the vulnerable signing key remains configured and the platform-admin bootstrap remains enabled, forged access survives password rotation, account deletion, and session revocation, allowing administrative disclosure, modification, and service disruption. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| IBM | mcp-context-forge | <1.0.2 |
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