Sakai: IDOR in Profile Image Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Any User's Profile Image
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Sakai is a Collaboration and Learning Environment (CLE). From 23.0 until 23.5 and 25.3, the DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/image endpoint allows an authenticated user to delete another user's profile image because ProfileController.removeProfileImage() passes the attacker-controlled userId to ProfileServiceImpl.removeProfileImage() without verifying ownership, and profileImageUploadedRepository.deleteById(userId) removes the selected row. The related DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/pronunciation endpoint also omits session validation and ownership checks before ProfileServiceImpl.removePronunciationRecording() deletes the target user's recording. The upload path is not affected because it already verifies ownership, and superusers remain intentionally authorized to modify other profiles. Successful exploitation can repeatedly remove profile identity artifacts, including administrator and instructor images, and disrupt workflows that rely on those artifacts. This issue is fixed in versions 23.5, 25.3, and 26.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| sakaiproject | >=23.0 <23.5, >=25.0 <=25.2 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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