wolfSSL ARIA-GCM TLS 1.2/DTLS 1.2 GCM nonce reuse
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 5.9.1.
In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter, and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL | >=5.2.1 <5.9.1 | 5.9.1 |
Timeline
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