CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK basemap import (PUT /api/basemap) — no IP-classification guard
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to 13.22.1, the authenticated PUT /api/basemap endpoint passes an attacker-controlled URL through importBasemapURL() in api/routes/basemap.ts to fetch(url) without resolved-address classification or redirect revalidation. BasemapProtocol.isValidURL in api/lib/interface-basemap.ts checks only the HTTP or HTTPS scheme and is not applied on the vulnerable import path. Direct internal addresses, alternate IP encodings, and redirects to internal addresses can reach cloud metadata, loopback, private, and CGNAT HTTP services. The OptionalTileJSON response reflects fields including name, attribution, and tiles[0] to the caller, making the request forgery full-read rather than blind and enabling cloud credential theft and internal service disclosure. This issue is fixed in version 13.22.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| dfpc-coe | <13.22.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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